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This article compares the effects of board size, proportion of female directors,
proportion of outside directors and average age of directors on firm performance in
Japanese and Australian firms. We found that board size and age of directors
were negatively associated with the performance of Japanese firms. For Australian
firms, outsider ratio and female director ratio were positively associated with
performance.
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Introduction
Boards of directors play an important role in the governance structure of
large organizations (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Corporate governance refers
to the ‘integrated set of internal and external controls’ (Baysinger and
Hoskisson, 1990: 72) and incentive arrangements that are used to harmonize
the interests of the principals (owners or shareholders) with the interests
of the designated agents, the managers (Berle and Means, 1932; Williamson,
1984). The board of directors acts as the formal link between the share-
holders of the firm and the managers entrusted with running the organiza-
tion (Monks and Minow, 1995). Hence, boards can be described as the
‘apex of the firm’s decision control system’ (Fama and Jensen, 1983: 311),
which plays a key role in monitoring and controlling managers (Dalton
et al., 1999).
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The literature identifies two broad systems of corporate governance, the first
system being associated with the Anglo-Saxon countries (in particular, the
United States and the United Kingdom) and the second system covering
Continental Europe (in particular Germany) and Japan. Most empirical
research on corporate governance has concentrated on these countries
(Craswell et al., 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gedajlovic and Shapiro,
1998). However, differences in economic conditions and institutional influences
(for example, variations in capital markets, product and factor markets,
internal control systems and political, legal and regulatory systems) may
influence agency costs arising from different ownership structures (Jensen,
1993). Hence, some of the issues relevant to companies in the United States or
the United Kingdom may not be significant for companies listed in other
countries, such as Australia (Craswell et al., 1997).
The aim of this article is to investigate the influence of national
differences in corporate governance on firm performance by examining
large organizations in Japan and Australia. Australia was chosen because it
faces significantly different legal, economic and institutional circumstances
(Craswell et al., 1997; Hanson et al., 2002). The separation of ownership and
control upon which the US and UK systems of corporate governance are based
may not be as significant an issue for Australian listed companies (Farrar,
2001), and might not give rise to the type of agency problems identified for
large US companies (Craswell et al., 1997). Hence, a comparison between the
corporate governance systems in Australia and Japan may provide us with a
better understanding of the extent to which the assumptions of agency theory
can be applied in another context and the types of mechanisms that may
influence the agency problem in different countries.
Specifically, we examine the effects of board structure, namely board size,
proportion of outside directors, average age of directors and the proportion of
female directors on firm performance in Japanese and Australian firms. We
expect to find significant differences between the two countries with respect to the
effects of board structure on firm performance, because of the different national
contexts in which the Japanese and the Australian boards operate. In particular,
we expect Australian boards to be more responsive to the interests of shareholders
than Japanese boards, due to Australia’s market-based governance philosophy.
Conversely, we expect Japanese boards to place a greater emphasis on the
interests of various stakeholders, due to its group-based or network-oriented
governance system (Weimer and Pape, 1999; Carati and Tourani Rad, 2000).
The article proceeds as follows: first, we discuss the national contexts in
which Japanese and Australian boards operate, and we develop a series of
hypotheses about the effect of board structure on performance. We then
present the results of the data analysis, and conclude with a discussion of the
findings, and suggestions for future research.
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National Contexts of Japanese and Australian Boards
The corporate governance systems of Japan and Australia have evolved within
different regulatory, institutional and political environments. The group-based
or network-oriented corporate governance system of Japan (Weimer and Pape,
1999; Carati and Tourani Rad, 2000) is characterized by long-term relation-
ships between different stakeholders who have a substantial influence on
strategic decision-making. Aoki (1984) described the Japanese firm as a
coalition of employees and a coalition of shareholders, which is integrated and
mediated by management to strike a balance between the interests of the two
parties. The importance of employees in strategic decision-making, according
to Weimer and Pape (1999), is due to Japanese culture, which places great
emphasis on family values and the importance of achieving consensus.
Major industrial sectors in Japan are organized as networks of firms that are
characterized by extensive cross-shareholdings (Clark, 1979; Lincoln et al.,
1992). These corporate networks, known as keiretsu, usually revolve around a
main bank, which serves as trade mediator, payment guarantor and
information provider to client firms. The main bank owns a large portion of
the network’s equity, and serves as a lead lender to the keiretsu firms. As a
large debt holder, the main bank often acts as an advisor and agent to the
firm’s cash management and financial planning activities (Sheard, 1989; Aoki,
1990). As a large equity holder, the main bank also has a natural incentive to
protect the long-term value of the firm’s equity. However, while Japanese
banks often hold shares in their client firms, they do so to cement business
relationships (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Morck and Nakamura, 1999), rather
than to earn investment returns. In addition, since main banks are major debt
holders, their strategic emphasis on asset allocations tend toward stability and
lower risk, rather than maximization of return on equity. In addition to the
banks, many non-financial firms also hold stocks of other firms, often on a
reciprocal basis. These corporate shareholders, like bank shareholders, hold
shares not necessarily to earn investment returns but to stabilize trading
relationships and long-term alliances (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Kester, 1991).
Thus, the interests of banks, corporate shareholders and other investors who
have no on-going business ties do not always converge.
Boards of many Japanese firms are usually dominated by insiders or former
employees, because the board position is seen as the highest rank within a firm
that long-serving employees can aspire to reach (Heftel, 1983; Abegglen and
Stalk, 1985; Charkham, 1994). Since board members are de facto subordinates
of the President or CEO, it is not usually expected that they monitor senior
executives or raise opposing views. There are often a small number of outside
directors who come from other organizations, such as banks and affiliated
firms (Kishida, 1996). These directors are often transferred to cement business
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relationships rather than to monitor management. This implies that directors
who have been transferred from banks and other corporations are not expected
to look after the interests of shareholders alone. This naturally creates tension
between the bank, corporate shareholders and other owners of the firm’s
equity.
The extensive cross-shareholdings between large firms and their banks result
in stable and illiquid equities, which allow its member firms to enforce
managerial discipline through an internal capital market rather than through
the external market for corporate control (Kester, 1991; Gerlach, 1992; Gilson
and Roe, 1993). In fact, Japanese governance mechanisms and the strategies of
Japanese firms were often seen to facilitate long-term investments in capital
and R&D, and to generate high returns until the 1980s (Abegglen and Stalk,
1985; Porter, 1992). After the stock market crash in 1990, and the subsequent
economic decline, however, it is argued that the Japanese governance system
based on stable ownership and monitoring by the main bank has not been
functioning well and has become a hindrance to the restructuring of Japanese
firms to enable them to regain their competitiveness (Aoki et al., 1994; Sheard,
1997). Thus, there are increasing calls to change or revise the Japanese
governance system by incorporating some components of the US system of
corporate governance (Japan Corporate Governance Forum, 2001).
The market-based systems in the USA and UK are characterized by an
active external market for corporate control, often referred to as the takeover
market (Weimer and Pape, 1999). Takeovers are seen as a means to discipline
firms, allowing control to be transferred from inefficient to efficient manage-
ment teams, hence serving as a mechanism for independent shareholders to
influence strategic decision-making. Thus, firms in the market-based systems
face strong pressures from the product and factor markets as well as the
managerial labor markets, which force managers to pay a great deal of
attention to shareholder value and the creation of shareholder wealth (Carati
and Tourani Rad, 2000).
In Australia, the market for corporate control is not as active as in the US
and UK and, according to Suchard et al. (2001), its effectiveness in inducing
boards to be strict monitors and to take corrective action may not be
comparable to the US and the UK. Such limited market for corporate control
could lead to less attention being paid to shareholders, and may thus result in
negative effects on overall firm performance. Key features of the US system,
such as class actions and contingency fees (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), do not
exist in Australia, where successful defendants are entitled to costs and
damages (Craswell et al., 1997). As a consequence, securities litigation,
frequently found in the US, is rare in Australia.
Similarly, proxy contests are rare among Australian firms and those holding
more than 20 per cent of capital are limited to purchasing no more than an
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additional 3 per cent over any given 6-month period, unless a full takeover
offer is made (Craswell et al., 1997). In June 1986, Australia adopted
amendments to the takeover legislation that restricted the way in which partial
takeover can be conducted, and allowed target companies to implement anti-
takeover charter amendments to make hostile takeovers more difficult (Lange
et al., 2000). As a result of this change, partial takeovers dropped from 40 per
cent of all takeovers in 1982 to between 1 and 4 per cent of all takeovers from
1991 to 1993 (Lange et al., 2000).
An important difference between Australia and the US and UK is the
percentage of shares in listed companies held by local institutions. In 1998,
Australian institutions owned 36.9 per cent of Australian equities, and overseas
investors, of which about one-third were institutions, held 31.7 per cent
(Farrar, 2001). In the UK, approximately 60 per cent of shares in listed
companies were held by local institutions, with a further 20 per cent held by
overseas institutions. In the US, about 50 per cent of shares were held by local
institutions, but the percentage rose to 60 per cent for the top 1000 companies
(Farrar, 2001). Hence, institutions in the US and UK are a ‘significant force to
be reckoned with’ (Mallin, 2001: 119), whereas institutions in Australia have a
less important role to play.
In addition to the smaller percentage of shares owned by local institutions,
Australian institutions tend to exercise their voting rights considerably less
than their counterparts in the US (Farrar, 2001). In particular, Australian
institutions did not support compulsory voting, voted only on issues of major
significance, and interventions by institutions have been infrequent (Farrar,
2001). A number of laws restrict active involvement with boards or manage-
ment by Australian institutions. As Craswell et al have noted, ‘such
involvement creates a risk that institutional investors may be deemed
equivalent to corporate management, thereby dramatically increasing the
potential liability faced by institutional fund managers’ (1997: 309). As a result,
institutional investors have less impact on corporate performance than in the
US. The low level of ownership by local institutions and their limited exercise
of voting rights may have a positive impact on shareholder attention, because
firms are less likely to be influenced by the institutional fund managers’
demand for strong quarterly performance results and hence are more likely to
manage for the long term (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening,
1999).
Another important difference between Australia and the US and UK is
incentive compensation, which is an important mechanism for aligning the
interests of shareholders with those of managers. In Australia, the use of
annual bonuses is relatively minor, namely about 14.5 per cent, compared to
60 per cent in the US and 45 per cent in the UK (Hanson et al., 2002).
This suggests, according to Craswell et al. (1997), that incentive-based
Ingrid Bonn et al.
Effects of Board Structure on Japanese and American Firms
109
Asian Business & Management 2004 3
compensation is less likely to mitigate agency problems in Australian firms and
may have a negative effect on attention paid to shareholders.
Despite the possibly negative effects on shareholder attention by the limited
market for corporate control and the low level of incentive-based compensa-
tion, Australian directors clearly focus on shareholders as opposed to other
stakeholders. Research by Francis (1997) showed that Australian directors, like
their US counterparts, gave first priority to shareholders (74 per cent), despite
the fact that the law states that a director’s first duty is to the company. This is
in contrast with the results for Japanese directors, where the company and
customers ranked highest, followed closely by employees (Francis, 1997).
In summary, the above review shows that (1) there are a number of
significant differences between the US and UK, the corporate governance
systems of which have been studied extensively, and Australia, and (2)
Japanese and Australian boards operate in significantly different contexts.
Hence, the intra-Asia-Pacific comparison that this study has undertaken will
add valuable knowledge and understanding about the contribution of different
national contexts to the agency problem.
The next section deals with the differences in Japanese and Australian board
structures and develops hypotheses as to how these differences influence firm
performance. We examine the effects of board size, proportion of outside
directors, average age of directors and proportion of female directors on firm
performance.
Boards of Directors in Japanese and Australian Firms
Board size and diversity
Board size is regarded as an important determinant of effective corporate
governance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Dalton et al., 1999).
Resource dependence theory suggests that larger boards are associated with
higher levels of firm performance, because larger boards may have a better
ability to form environmental links and secure critical resources (Pfeffer, 1972,
1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Goodstein et al., 1994). Pfeffer (1972, 1973)
found that board size was associated with responsiveness to resource
dependencies and regulatory pressures. Similarly, Pfeffer and Salancik argued
that ‘the greater the need for effective external linkage, the larger the board
should be’ (1978: 172). Although a larger board does not always lead to greater
diversity in terms of background, as there can be a large and monolithic
board,1 prior studies show that expanding the size of the board often, if not
always, provides an increased pool of expertise, and therefore information and
advice of a quality unobtainable from other corporate staff (Pfeffer, 1983;
Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Forbes and Milliken,
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1999). In addition, Singh and Harianto (1989) suggested that larger boards
might enhance corporate governance by reducing CEO domination. The meta-
analysis by Dalton et al. (1999) has shown a positive relationship between
board size and financial performance.
A number of authors have also pointed out the disadvantages associated
with large boards and diversity. Large and more diverse boards may be less
cohesive (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), more difficult to coordinate due to the
large number of potential interactions among group members (Gladstein, 1984;
Forbes and Milliken, 1999), and be prone to fractionalization and in-fighting
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Ocasio, 1994). Largeness can significantly inhibit a
board’s ability to initiate strategic changes (Goodstein et al., 1994), and large
boards are less likely to become involved in strategic decision-making (Judge
and Zeithaml, 1992). Jensen (1993) suggested that boards should have a
maximum of seven or eight members in order to function effectively. A board
with eight or less members ‘engenders greater focus, participation, and genuine
interaction and debate’ (Firstenberg and Malkiel, 1994: 34). Similarly, Lipton
and Lorsch (1992) recommended limiting the membership of boards to 10
people, with a preferred size of eight or nine.
In summary, the above research suggests that board size may be either
positively or negatively associated with firm performance. Both positions
are based on empirical research, and have been well argued in the literature.
We propose that it is possible to reconcile the conflicting views and to
combine them in a meaningful way. When the board size is very large,
the disadvantages, such as lack of cohesiveness, coordination difficulties
and fractionalization, are most severe, and they become less prevalent as board
size decreases. Conversely, a very small board cannot take advantage of
the pool of expertise, information and advice of a larger board, but
these benefits emerge when the board becomes larger. In other words,
increases in board size are likely to have a positive effect on firm perfor-
mance when boards are smaller, and a negative effect when boards are
larger. Thus, we propose that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship
between board size and firm performance. This hypothesis builds upon the
research by Golden and Zajac (2001), who found that board size was positively
related to strategic change for smaller boards, but negatively related to
strategic change for larger boards.
It is important to note that Australian boards are usually small, with an
average number of fewer than ten directors (Stapledon and Lawrence, 1996;
Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). It can be argued that the board size of Australian
firms tends to be smaller than optimal. We therefore expect a positive
relationship between board size and performance for Australian firms.
On the other hand, Japanese boards are usually very large, as large as over
60 directors for some firms (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Dalton and Kesner,
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1987; Yoshikawa and Phan, 2001), and thus board size tends to be larger than
optimal for Japanese firms. While the resource dependence argument suggests
that the large number of board members is helpful in obtaining resources, it
does not promote substantive discussions on firm strategies and quick decision-
making, which are increasingly important in the recent competitive environ-
ment. Further, as Japanese boards are dominated by former employees who
are de facto subordinates of the top executive, a large board size does not
necessarily lead to diversity, and is also not conducive to strategic discussions.
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between board size and
performance for Japanese firms.
Hypothesis 1a: Board size is positively associated with firm performance in
Australian firms.
Hypothesis 1b: Board size is negatively associated with firm performance in
Japanese firms.
In addition to the board size, another way to measure diversity is
gender. Board diversity, defined as the presence of women in key gover-
nance positions, has been linked to a variety of positive business outcomes
(Schwartz, 1980, 1992; Morrison, 1992; Fernandez, 1993; Mattis, 1993).
Katzenbach et al. (1995) showed that many organizations have under-
utilized human resources such as females. By employing a higher percentage
of women, firms are likely to perform better financially (Blackburn et al.,
1994), and to be more progressive and competitive, because their manage-
ment contingents better mirror the composition of existing markets
(Shrader et al., 1997).
Hence, the changing business environment, such as the greater participation
of women in the workforce, their investment activities and purchasing power as
consumers (Shilton et al., 1996) have increased the diversity in the marketplace,
requiring organizations to adapt by changing the internal composition of their
top teams and corporate boards (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Shrader et al.,
1997). By including a greater proportion of women in their boards of directors,
organizations should be able to deal more effectively with diversity in their
product and labor markets (Morrison, 1992; Fernandez, 1993), and gain
competitive advantage over their rivals (Mattis, 1993).
The above arguments apply to both Japan and Australia. We therefore
expect a positive relationship between the number of female directors and
performance in both countries.
Hypothesis 1c: The proportion of female directors is positively associated with
firm performance for Japanese and Australian firms.
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Proportion of outside directors
The composition of a firm’s board is typically a surrogate for the extent to
which the board is independent of the firm’s CEO (Dalton et al., 1999). Outside
directors are regarded as more independent than inside directors and can
therefore monitor managerial performance more effectively (Fama, 1980;
Chaganti et al., 1985; Dalton and Kesner, 1987). Therefore, in conceptual
terms, it is generally agreed that effective boards have a high proportion of
outside directors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Mizruchi, 1983; Lorsch and
MacIver, 1989; Zahra and Pearce, 1989).
While there are studies that have shown contradictory results (eg, Baysinger
et al., 1991; Chaganti et al., 1985), a large number of studies have found that a
high proportion of outside board members has positive effects (eg, Baysinger
and Butler, 1985; Kosnik, 1987; Schellenger et al., 1989; Pearce and Zahra,
1992). Kosnik (1987), for example, investigated different board characteristics
that did or did not resist greenmail payments, and found that board
effectiveness in preventing greenmail payments was related to the proportion
of outside directors. Singh and Harianto (1989), who examined the influence of
outside directors on a ’golden parachute’ contract when there was no takeover
threat, found that firms that had adopted golden parachutes had higher
proportions of outside directors than those that had not adopted them.
However, Baysinger et al. (1991) found that outsider-dominated boards are
related to unrelated diversification, which is not consistent with prior studies
(Rumelt, 1974; Amihud and Lev, 1981).
Despite some opposing findings, it is widely accepted that the ideal board
should have a large proportion of outside directors. A possible explanation for
the impact of outside directors on firm strategies that enhance performance is
that outside directors introduce a balance of power into the ‘upper echelons’
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984) of organizations, by representing shareholder
interests that might not receive as much attention if the board were composed
only of insiders. Hence, the results of the above studies suggest that outside
directors can effectively monitor managerial behavior if they have sufficient
influence over management.
The above arguments can be applied to Australian boards of which the
majority of members are outsiders (Stapledon and Lawrence, 1996). We expect
a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors and firm
performance.
Hypothesis 2a: The proportion of outside directors on the board is positively
associated with firm performance for Australian firms.
In Japanese firms, the majority of board members are selected from the
ranks of employees (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Charkham, 1994), because the
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board of directors is often seen as the highest position that employees can
aspire to reach. Because of this, directors simply occupy the highest
management positions, and do not have the monitoring function seen in the
Anglo-Saxon countries.
While there are a small number of outside directors on boards, their
proportion is much smaller in Japanese firms than in Australian firms. In
addition, the role of these outside directors is different from that in Australia.
Japanese outside directors are often selected from the management of the
firm’s main bank and/or its suppliers and affiliated firms. Because these banks
and firms own shares in other firms not to earn investment returns but to
cement business relationships, they are not likely to pressure management to
improve firm performance. On the contrary, directors from banks and
affiliated firms may prefer policies that allocate more resources to stabilize
and increase trade flow with a firm’s business partners at the expense of
profitability. According to resource dependence theory, those related outsiders
can contribute in establishing the external relationships and thereby reducing
transaction costs.2 However, the main motive of such outside directors is not to
monitor managerial decisions that maximize the company’s profits and serve
the interests of market investors who invest in the company to earn investment
returns. Because of this, lower transaction costs will not necessarily lead to
higher profits. Therefore, we do not expect that the presence of outside
directors in Japan will enhance firm profits.
Hypothesis 2b: The proportion of outside directors on the board is negatively
associated with firm performance for Japanese firms.
Age of board members
A number of previous studies have examined the relationship between the age
of top executives and organizational characteristics. Hitt and Tyler (1991), for
example, found that executives’ ages affected the strategic evaluation of
acquisition candidates. The research by Wiersema and Bantel (1992) showed
that firms were more likely to undergo major changes in corporate strategy if
they were run by younger managers.
Research has suggested that cognitive abilities, including learning ability,
reasoning and memory decrease as people age (Botwinick, 1977; Burke and
Light, 1981). To older executives, both financial security and career security
may become more important, and they might try to avoid risky decisions
(Carlson and Karlsson, 1970; Vroom and Pahl, 1971). A positive aspect of
older managers is that they have more accumulated experiences that can
potentially be utilized to improve firm operations.
Ingrid Bonn et al.
Effects of Board Structure on Japanese and American Firms
114
Asian Business & Management 2004 3
Younger managers, on the other hand, tend to pursue more risky and innovative
growth strategies (Guthrie and Olian, 1991), and seem to handle new and creative
ideas better than older managers (Campbell, 1987), although their experiences are
limited in comparison with older managers. Low executive age has been associated
with corporate growth, also volatility of sales and earnings (Hart and Mellons,
1970; Child, 1974). Younger managers tend to bring better cognitive resources for
decision-making tasks (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), and have more energy and
stamina (Child, 1974) to implement new decisions (Campbell, 1987). In addition,
younger managers are likely to have received their education more recently, and
can be expected to have superior technical knowledge (Bantel and Jackson, 1989).
Hence, older managers have an advantage in terms of accumulated
experiences, whereas younger managers tend to have more creative and
innovative approaches and superior learning ability and memory. In a business
environment in which a changing competitive landscape is the norm and
innovation is constantly required, it can be argued that younger managers’
innovativeness and learning ability are more important than older managers’
experiences that were accumulated in a different environment. Based on this
view, and in line with the research findings outlined above, we expect a
negative influence of age on firm performance. The effects of age on Japanese
and Australian boards should be similar.
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative association between the average age of board
members and financial performance in Japanese and Australian firms.
Table 1 summarizes the expected results.
Data
Sample
The Japanese sample consists of 169 manufacturing firms from the Nikkei 300
Index. These firms were selected because complete data were available from
Table 1 Expected results
Performance
Australia Japan
Board size + 
Outsider ratio + 
Director age  
Female ratio + +
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published sources. The data were collected from Yakuin Shikoho (Board of
Director Handbook) and Nikkei Kaisha Joho. The Australian sample consists
of 104 manufacturing firms from the top 500 companies in Australia. The data
were collected from Huntleys’ Shareholder: The Handbook of Australian Public
Companies, and the companies’ annual reports. We used the 1998 data for the
independent variables and the 1999 data for the dependent variables, and there
is therefore a 1-year lag between these. We chose to use manufacturing firms so
that we could control for accounting differences between manufacturing and
service firms.
Variables
Dependent variables
In this study, we collected the dependent variable for 1999, the last full year of
complete data we could find for both Australian and Japanese firms. Return
on assets (ROA) and market-to-book value ratio (MB ratio) were used to
measure firm performance. ROA is an accounting measure that assesses the
efficiency of assets employed. We chose this measure because it has been widely
used in other studies (eg, Lincoln et al., 1992; Shrader et al., 1997). MB ratio is
a measure of market performance, and can be defined as the ratio of the
market value of a firm’s assets divided by the replacement cost of those assets
(Vogt and Vu, 2000). Thus, we calculated this measure as the ratio of market
capitalization to the current book value of total assets.
Independent variables
Board size was measured as the total number of directors on the board of each
sample firm. Female ratio was measured as the ratio of female directors to total
directors. Outsider ratio was measured as the ratio of outside directors to total
directors. Director age was measured as the average age of all directors in each
firm. The independent variables were collected for 1998, representing a 1-year
lag to the 1999 performance data.
We controlled for firm age in this study. Firm age can have an impact on
firm performance either positively or negatively. An older firm may have a
greater network of relationships, which can help the firm to access resources.
At the same time, an older firm can have a more rigid organizational structure
that can negatively affect firm performance.
Analysis and Results
We tested all hypotheses using multiple regression analysis. We ran our
regression analysis separately for Australian and Japanese firms, because some
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of our data are not directly comparable, due to the accounting differences
between Australia and Japan. As it is logical to expect a time lag between
board structure and firm performance, due to the temporal nature of the
decision-making process, we collected data that represented a 1-year lag
between board structure and firm performance. We also ran the analysis with
2-year lagged data, but found that the results were similar, and that the 1-year
lag gave stronger and clearer relationships among the variables. Tables 2 and 3
present Pearson’s correlations for the Japanese and Australian data. We note a
number of statistically significant relationships, but the data did not suggest
multicollinearity problems, which usually require correlations between the
independent variables of the order of 0.80 or more.
The results of the regression analyses are shown in Tables 4 and 5. With
the Australian firms, we found a positive relationship between the ratio of
female directors and MB ratio (t¼ 3.940, sig.¼ 0.000), which is consis-
tent with Hypothesis 1c. In Model 2, we found a positive relationship
between outside director ratio and ROA (t¼ 2.800, sig.¼ 0.006), supporting
Table 2 Correlation of variables for Australian firms
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 MB ratio 1.24 1.72 1.000
2 ROA 9.88 28.54 0.266** 1.000
3 Board size 7.36 2.60 0.182 0.042 1.000
4 Female ratio 4.00 6.71 0.285** 0.028 0.164 1.000
5 Outsider ratio 75.04 17.38 0.052 0.254* 0.122 0.179 1.000
6 Director age 56.71 2.61 0.021 0.007 0.062 0.106 0.428** 1.000
7 Firm age 43.44 36.68 0.186 0.131 0.331** 0.152 0.164 0.094
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Table 3 Correlation of variables for Japanese firms
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 MB ratio 0.90 0.72 1.000
2 ROA 2.15 2.55 0.672** 1.000
3 Board size 27.62 8.28 0.310** 0.208** 1.000
4 Female ratio 0.09 0.87 0.030 0.035 0.002 1.000
5 Outsider ratio 5.63 4.96 0.011 0.028 0.120 0.001 1.000
6 Director age 59.25 2.01 0.235** 0.136 0.058 0.008 0.077 1.000
7 Firm age 63.73 17.27 0.217** 0.247** 0.123 0.028 0.073 0.266**
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
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Hypothesis 2a. Thus, we found support for two of our hypotheses for
Australian firms.
Table 5, which shows the results for Japanese firms, indicates that the board
size (t¼3.953, sig.¼ 0.000) and the average age of directors (t¼2.384,
sig.¼ 0.018) are both negatively associated with MB ratio. These findings are
consistent with Hypotheses 1b and 3. We found no relationships between MB
ratio and outside director ratio and female director ratio. Board size is also
negatively associated with ROA, thus supporting Hypothesis 1b as well
(t¼2.466, sig.¼ 0.015). We could not find any relationships between the
other independent variables and ROA.
In summary, the ratio of female directors and outside directors was
positively associated with one of the performance measures for Australian
firms (Table 6). For Japanese firms, board size was negatively associated with
both performance measures. In addition, age of directors was negatively
related to the market measure.
Table 4 Regression results for Australian firms
Dependent variable Model 1: MB ratio Model 2: ROA
Beta t-value Sig. Beta t-value Sig.
(Constant) 0.264 0.793 0.848 0.399
Board size 0.120 1.138 0.258 0.005 0.049 0.961
Female ratio 0.411 3.940 0.000 0.066 0.606 0.546
Outsider ratio 0.120 1.089 0.280 0.321 2.800 0.006
Director age 0.103 0.935 0.352 0.151 1.326 0.188
Firm age 0.190 1.778 0.079 0.172 1.540 0.127
R2¼ 0.192; Adj R2¼ 0.142; F¼ 3.890 R2¼ 0.124; Adj R2¼ 0.070; F¼ 2.313
Table 5 Regression results for Japanese firms
Dependent variable Model 1: MB ratio Model 2: ROA
Beta t-value Sig. Beta t-value Sig.
(Constant) 3.739 0.000 1.888 0.061
Board size 0.288 3.953 0.000 0.186 2.466 0.015
Outsider ratio 0.035 0.492 0.623 0.041 0.559 0.577
Female ratio 0.042 0.580 0.562 0.060 0.802 0.424
Director age 0.178 2.384 0.018 0.064 0.825 0.411
Firm age 0.138 1.843 0.067 0.213 2.738 0.007
R2¼ 0.163; Adj R2¼ 0.137; F¼ 6.334 R2¼ 0.103; Adj R2¼ 0.076; F¼ 3.748
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Discussion and Conclusions
This study aimed to examine the effects of board structure on firm
performance in Japanese and Australian firms. We found that board size
was negatively associated with both MB ratio and ROA for Japanese firms.
This finding supports the view that large boards are less cohesive, more
difficult to coordinate and tend to be less involved in strategic decision-making.
We have argued previously that Japanese firms tend to use board membership
as a reward for long-serving employees, or as positions for affiliated firms and
banks to cement business relationships, rather than as a means to improve
shareholder wealth. Building upon this argument, we speculate that board size
in Japanese firms may have a negative influence on performance, not only
because of its largeness but also because directors are usually selected on the
basis of their business relationships with the firm rather than their potential
contribution to firm performance.
Interestingly, board size showed no influence on either MB ratio or ROA for
Australian firms. We had proposed an inverted U-shaped relationship between
board size and firm performance, hypothesizing that board size would be
positively related with performance in Australian firms and negatively in
Japanese firms. We did find support for the negative influence of board size for
Japanese firms as outlined above, but the results for the Australian firms did
not confirm our predictions. Our original argument was that the board size of
Australian firms tends to be small and that this could lead to disadvantages in
terms of environmental links, the ability to secure critical resources and the
access to directors’ expertise, information and advice. Following this line of
thought, we expected that Australian boards would benefit from an increased
number of members, and we therefore hypothesized a positive relationship
between board size and firm performance. Our data clearly rejected this view.
We found that it is not the size of the board, per se, that is important for firm
Table 6 Results summary
MB Ratio ROA
Australia Japan Australia Japan
Expected Result Expected Result Expected Result Expected Result
Board size + No  Yes + No  Yes
Female + Yes + No + No + No
Outsider ratio + No  No + Yes  No
Director age  No  Yes  No  No
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performance, but rather the composition of the board in terms of the ratios of
outside and female directors. Board size is only a measure of the factual
number of directors, and does not indicate the tasks and roles they perform.
Hence, we could argue that it is the skills and knowledge base that the board
brings to the firm that is important for performance, rather than board size.
In addition, board size does not indicate process-oriented variables, such as
group dynamics and behavior patterns, which might influence firm perfor-
mance. Hence, in addition to bringing in sufficient members with appropriate
skills and knowledge, the ability of boards to leverage the directors’ multiple
roles may be important for company performance (Dalton et al., 1999).
With respect to outside directors and female directors of Japanese firms, one
possible reason that we could not find support is that that their numbers are
too small to have any impact on firm performance (5.63 per cent for outsiders
and 0.86 per cent for females). Therefore, in order to assess their influence on
performance and strategies, we have to give more time for Japanese firms to
increase outsiders and female members on the board. Some Japanese firms
have recently started including independent outsiders on their boards as part of
the corporate governance reform. If this trend continues, we may be able to see
the impact of outside directors on performance. Lastly, our result on the
relationship between directors’ age and MB ratio in Japanese firms is
consistent with previous research, which found a negative association between
the two variables. In summary, our results indicate that the board size and the
average age of directors have an influence on firm performance in Japanese
firms, whereas outside directors and female directors do not seem to function
as a monitoring devise to enhance shareholders’ interests.
In contrast to Japanese firms, we found that outside directors of Australian
firms have a significant impact on firm performance. The finding that the ratio
of outside directors was positively associated with ROA is consistent with
theory, and suggests that the independence of directors is an important
indicator of board effectiveness. One reason that we could not find consistent
findings between MB ratio and ROA is that they are negatively correlated for
the Australian sample, possibly because several sample firms, which are small
and venture-type firms, have large negative ROA yet very high market
valuations. Further, 1998 and 1999 were very bullish years for stock markets
and the MB ratio may therefore have been overvalued.3 Thus, ROA may be a
more reliable performance measure during this period, especially for the
Australian sample. The positive association between the ratio of female
directors and performance for Australian firms is also consistent with theory. It
seems that diversity on the board has a positive effect on the performance of
Australian firms.
The above findings confirm the importance of national context on corporate
governance practices. Institutional differences across countries clearly matter,
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and management theorists and researchers need to take national context into
consideration when applying existing theory in different countries, or
developing new theory. More specifically, there may be different agency
relationships in different countries, and it is necessary to be cautious when
interpreting and generalizing the results across national boundaries.
Although our results indicate the need to take national context into
consideration when applying or developing new theory on corporate
governance, the country-specific hypotheses developed earlier received only
mixed support. This indicates that we may need more in-depth, and possibly
qualitative, research in order to identify the processes and behavior patterns
that underlie these institutional differences.
There are some limitations to this study. First, we only used data between
1998 and 1999. Generalizability of the results would have been enhanced if we
had used data from a longer period. Second, we were unable to examine the
impact of outside directors’ background and the tenure of board members on
performance, due to the lack of data. Ideally, a more detailed examination of
the directors’ background and duration of tenure would give us more
comprehensive insights into the relationships between the board of directors,
firm performance and board policy.
In terms of future research, there is a need to continue this cross-country
comparative approach to examine the effectiveness of the governance
role played by the board in different national contexts. Such studies should
also investigate process and behavioral dynamics on boards to gain a
more in-depth understanding of how the agency problem is resolved in
different countries.
In addition, further research should investigate whether Japan and other
countries that are exposed to global capital market pressure maintain their
current approaches to corporate governance, or whether they tend to converge
with the Anglo-Saxon system. Our findings on the board size and age of
directors in Japanese firms imply that the board of directors does play some
monitoring role in Japan, although outside directors still appear to have a very
limited role. As Japanese firms are increasingly exposed to global capital
market pressure, due to partial unwinding of keiretsu shareholdings, they may
be subject to more pressure to respond to market investors’ needs, including
the restructuring of the board (Yoshikawa and Phan, 2001). If the current
trend continues, Japanese firms may need to utilize their board more effectively
as a monitoring mechanism. Future research should investigate this area in
more depth.
Notes
1 We thank one of the reviewers for pointing out this possibility.
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2 We thank one of the reviewers for raising this issue.
3 We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this.
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